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ETHICS

FLATT v. SUPERIOR COURT OF SONOMA
COUNTY: ATTORNEY WITHDRAWAL FROM
CONCURRENT REPRESENTATIONS
Michael Edelman
I.

INTRODUCTION

Client A hires Attorney to file a lawsuit against B. Unbeknownst to A and the Attorney, Attorney's firm already represents B in an unrelated matter. Upon learning of the conflict of interest, Attorney withdraws from representation of A
without giving A information regarding the impending statute of limitations deadline. After failing to file the lawsuit
within the limitations period, A sues Attorney for malpractice
for failing to give withdrawal information concerning the
statute of limitations. Did Attorney have a duty to give A information about the limitations period upon withdrawal, despite the fact that the providing of such information would be
contrary to the interests of B, the Attorney's pre-existing
client?
1
In Flatt v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, the
Supreme Court of California was confronted with just this
factual situation. The Court consequently had to decide
whether an attorney could be held liable for failing to give
advice to a client upon withdrawal of representation, where
the withdrawal was made in order to avoid a concurrent representation. The Court held that an attorney had no legal
duty to provide advice in such a situation, and therefore could
2
not be held liable for failing to give such advice.
This article will first review the conflicting ethical duties
at issue in the Flatt case-the duty to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the client upon withdrawal and the duty of loyalty.
1. 885 P.2d 950 (Cal. 1994).
2. Id. at 959-60.
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The article will then summarize the Flatt case itself, and describe how both the majority and dissenting opinions attempt
to resolve the difficult legal and ethical dilemma posed in the
case. The article will thereafter point out the numerous flaws
contained within the majority and dissenting opinions in
Flatt. Lastly, the article postulates that no conflict necessarily exists between the duty to avoid foreseeable prejudice
upon withdrawal and the duty of loyalty, and explains why
an attorney should be under a legal duty to give legal advice
under the factual situation examined in Flatt.
II. BACKGROUND

A. The Duty of Loyalty
The principle that an attorney owes a duty of loyalty to a
client is "a basic tenet of the Anglo-American conception of
the lawyer-client relationship."3 The ABA Model Rules, in
fact, specifically state that "loyalty is an essential element in
the lawyer's relationship to a client."4 This duty of loyalty
mandates that the attorney should be in a position to "vigorously assert" whatever objective the client may choose, without any impairment of the attorney's commitment as a result
of conflicting interests.5 The attorney should "be able to be
fully open and candid with the client and forceful and singleasserting the client's position with all other
minded in
6
persons."
The duty of loyalty is most particularly manifested in the
numerous ethical rules which prohibit an attorney from undertaking concurrent, or simultaneous, representations-situations in which an attorney represents clients with conflicting interests. The ABA Model Code, for instance, mandates
that an attorney "decline proffered employment" if the attorney's "independent professional judgment" on behalf of another client is likely to be adversely affected by the employment, or if the employment would be "likely to involve him in
representing differing interests".7 The ABA Model Rules
3. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 316 (1986).
4. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 comment (1994).

5. WOLFRAM, supra note 3, at 317.
6. Id.

7. Model Code of Professional Conduct DR 5-105(A) (1994). Further, an
attorney cannot continue such a dual representation if it has already been created. Id. at DR 5-105(B). An attorney can, however, undertake or continue the
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state that a "lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client will be directly adverse to another client."' Similarly, the California Rules of Professional Conduct
state that an attorney shall not "accept or continue representation of more than one client in a matter in which the interests of the clients actually conflict."9
Courts have made explicit that concurrent representations are prohibited by these rules because they violate the
attorney's duty of loyalty. As succinctly stated in Grievance
0
Comm. of the Bar of Hartford Cty. v. Rottner :
When a client engages the services of a lawyer in a given
piece of business he is entitled to feel that, until that business is finally disposed of in some manner, he has the undivided loyalty of the one upon whom he looks as his advocate and his champion. If, as in this case, he is sued and
his home attached by his own attorney, who is representing him in another matter, all feeling of loyalty is necessarily destroyed, and the profession is exposed to the
charge that it is interested only in money.
A client should, therefore, be able to rely upon the attorney's
"undivided allegiance and faithful, devoted service", and has
a right to expect that the attorney "would accept no retainer
to do anything that might be adverse to his client's interests."" As one legal scholar has stated:
Something seems radically out of place if a lawyer
sues one of the lawyer's own present clients in behalf of
another client. Even if the representations have nothing
to do with each other, so that no confidential information
is apparently jeopardized, the client who is sued can obvi12
ously claim that the lawyer's sense of loyalty is askew.
Even where there is no relationship between the subject
matter of the representations involved, courts have insisted
multiple employment if it is "obvious" that he can adequately represent both
clients, and if each client consents to the representation after full disclosure of
the possible effect of the representation. Id., DR 5-105(C).
8. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(a) (1994). Representation is allowed, however, if the lawyer "reasonably believes the representation
will not adversely affect the relationship with the other client", and "each client
consents after consultation." Id., Rule 1.7(a)(1),(2).
9. CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3-310 (1994).
10. 203 A.2d 82, 84 (1964).
11. Cinema, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1386 (2d Cir. 1976).
12. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 350 (1986).
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that concurrent representations be heavily scrutinized.1 3 A
lawyer who relies on the lack of substantial relationship between the litigation in which the lawyer is suing a client and
the matter in which the lawyer is representing the client, is
"leaning on a slender reed indeed ...Putting it as mildly as
we can, we think it would be questionable conduct for an attorney to participate in any lawsuit against his own client
without the knowledge and consent of all concerned."1 4 Some
courts have therefore concluded that a concurrent representation, even where the subject matter of the representations
are unrelated, is prima facie improper, and that a heavy burden is imposed on an attorney who seeks to justify it. 5
California courts have similarly invoked the attorney's
duty of loyalty to heavily scrutinize concurrent representations. The Supreme Court of California long ago stated that
it is a violation of an attorney's duty "for him to assume a
position adverse or antagonistic to his client without the latter's free and intelligent consent given after full knowledge of
all the facts and circumstances."1 6 The Court made clear the
rationale for this rule:
The rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to
preclude the honest practitioner from putting himself in a
position where he may be required to choose between conflicting duties, or be led to attempt to reconcile conflicting
interests, rather than to enforce to their full extent the
rights of the interest which he should alone represent.
It is improper, in fact, to accept employment adverse to a client even where the proffered employment is "unrelated to the
13. Cinema Ltd., 528 F.2d at 1386-87.
14. Id. See also IBM v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1978) ("an attorney
must be cautious in this area" and must "resolve all doubts in favor of full disclosure to a client of the facts of the attorney's concurrent representation"); Unified Sewerage Agency of Washington Cty. v. Jelco, Inc., 646 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir.
1981) (attorney should be disqualified where representation is undertaken adverse to present client unless there is client consent and it is "obvious" that
attorney can adequately represent the interests of each client).
15. See, e.g., Glueck v. Jonathan Logan, Inc., 653 F.2d 746, 749 (2d Cir.
1981); United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 629 P.2d 231, 319-20 (N.M.
1980). This standard was described by the Glueck court as a strict one which
"imposes upon counsel who seeks to avoid disqualification a burden so heavy
that it will rarely be met." Glueck, 653 F.2d at 749.
16. Anderson v. Eaton, 293 P. 788, 789-90 (Cal. 1930).
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existing representation." 17 Even if the representations are
unrelated, the employment is improper because of the "need
to assure the attorney's undivided loyalty and commitment to
the client."' 8 Absent effective consent, an attorney's duty
under California case law is to put an end to the concurrent
representation when such a situation develops.1 9
B.

The Duty to Avoid ForeseeablePrejudice to the Client
Upon Withdrawal

It is a well-recognized standard of professional conduct
that an attorney effectuate a withdrawal of representation in
such a manner as to avoid prejudice to the client. Both the
ABA Model Code and the ABA Model Rules include provisions which mandate that any withdrawal of representation
by an attorney be brought about by avoiding "foreseeable
prejudice" to the client.2 0 California has, as well, a ethical
rule prohibiting an attorney from withdrawing from representation of a client unless the attorney has "taken reasonable steps to avoid reasonably foreseeable prejudice to the
rights of the client, including giving due notice to the client,
allowing time for employment of other counsel, complying
with rule 3-700(D), and complying with applicable laws and
17. Jeffry v. Pounds, 136 Cal.Rptr. 373, 376 (Cal. 1977) ("A lay client is
likely to doubt the loyalty of a lawyer who undertakes to oppose him in an unrelated matter. Hence the decisions condemn acceptance of employment adverse
to a client even though the employment is unrelated to the existing
representation").
18. Civil Serv. Commn. of San Diego Cty. v. Superior Court of San Diego
Cty., 209 Cal.Rptr. 159, 164 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
19. See, e.g., Ishmael v. Millington, 50 Cal.Rptr. 592 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966).
20. ABA Model Code Disciplinary Rule 2-110(A)(2) provides:
In any event, a lawyer shall not withdraw from employment until he
has taken reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights
of his client, including giving due notice to this client, allowing time for
employment of other counsel, delivering to the client all papers and
property to which the client is entitled, and complying with applicable
laws and rules.
ABA Model Rule 1.16(d) provides:
Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the
extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of
other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is
entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been
earned. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law.
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rules."2 1 The Discussion to this rule states that the "reason-

repreable steps" an attorney must take upon withdrawal of
22
circumstances".
the
to
according
"vary
will
sentation
The Supreme Court of California has suggested that the
duty to avoid foreseeable prejudice upon withdrawal includes, in appropriate instances, the duty to advise a client to
seek other counsel. In Kirsch v. Duryea, 23 the Court, in reversing a legal malpractice judgment against the defendant
attorney for an improper withdrawal, referred approvingly to
the fact that the attorney had "advised plaintiff of the need
for quick action." 24 In the later Supreme Court case In re

Hickey,25 the Court, in following the recommendation of the
State Bar Court that the defendant attorney be disciplined
for an improper withdrawal, pointed out that the attorney
had failed to advise the client "in writing of his belief that her
medical malpractice case lacked merit" and did not advise the
client "in writing that she should promptly consult independent counsel to protect any potential legal rights she might
have."2 6
One California Court of Appeal has squarely held that
the lack of withdrawal advice can, in appropriate instances,
subject an attorney to malpractice liability. In Miller v. Metzinger,2 7 the court stated that a breach of duty could be found
in the defendant attorney's failure to "adviseplaintiffs of the
necessity to act promptly" in contacting successor counsel
upon withdrawal.28 The Miller court further held that this

duty may encompass informing the client of the limitations
21. CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3-700(A)(1994). Rule 3700(D) requires, inter alia, that the attorney release to the client upon withdrawal "client papers and property."
22. Id., Discussion to Rule 3-700.
23. 578 P.2d 935 (Cal. 1978).
24. Id. at 940.
25. 788 P.2d 684 (Cal. 1990).
26. Id. at 689.
27. 154 Cal.Rptr. 22 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979). In Miller, the plaintiffs sued four
different attorneys or law firms for malpractice, claiming that they were negligent in failing to file a wrongful death action within the relevant limitations
period. Id. at 23. Defendant Metzinger was an attorney who withdrew from
representation of the plaintiffs before the expiration of the limitations period.
Id. at 23. One of the many issues in the case was whether Metzinger acted
negligently in failing to advise the plaintiffs of the limitations period upon withdrawal. Id. at 28-29.
28. Id. at 29.
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period governing the client's claims.2 9 The court stated that,
if the defendant attorney knew upon withdrawal of representation that the relevant statute of limitations would expire
shortly, a breach of duty to plaintiffs would exist because no
advice was given as to the limitations period.3 °
The requirement that, in certain instances, an attorney
give advice to a client upon withdrawal is not unique to California jurisprudence. Many state's ethical rules, for instance,
are derived from the ABA Model Code, which expressly states
that an attorney should "protect the welfare of his client" by,
inter alia,"suggesting employment of other counsel."3 1 In addition, at least one other state Supreme Court has expressly
indicated that a duty to give advice to clients upon with32
drawal may exist. In Van Horn Lodge, Inc. v. White, the
Supreme Court. of Alaska suggested that a duty to advise the
plaintiff of "the pending deadline and the need to take timely
action to protect its interests" might have existed, but did not
decide the question because the plaintiff had not33alleged that
the defendant attorney had breached this duty.
The Conflict Between the Duty of Loyalty and the Duty
to Avoid ForeseeablePrejudice Upon Withdrawal
As has been shown, an attorney has a duty to avoid handling matters adverse to a client's interests as a result of the
attorney's duty of loyalty towards that client. 4 If an attorney
faced with a conflict between two clients subsequently withdraws from representation of one of the clients in order to
escape the concurrent representation, however, the attorney
may be under an obligation to give withdrawal advice if
needed to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the former client's
case. 35 However, any advice the attorney gives to the former
client (for example, regarding the relevant limitations period)
would run counter to the interests of the client whom the lawyer still represents.
C.

29. Id. at 28-29.
30. Id. Since the Miller court was dealing with a motion for summary judgment, the case was remanded to the trial court to ascertain whether in fact the
plaintiffs were not advised of the statute of limitations. Id. at 29.
31. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-32 (1994); see, e.g.,
Alaska Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-110(A)(2).
32. 627 P.2d 641 (Ala. 1981).
33. Id. at 644.
34. See supra notes 2-19 and accompanying text.
35. See supra notes 19-33 and accompanying text.
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It appears, therefore, that the giving of withdrawal advice when an attorney is terminating a concurrent representation constitutes a violation of the attorney's duty of loyalty
towards the remaining client, yet the failure to give such advice may constitute a failure of the attorney's duty to withdraw from representation so as to avoid foreseeable prejudice. It is this conflict of duties that is addressed by the
Court in Flatt v. Superior Court of SoCalifornia Supreme
36
County.
noma
D.

Flatt v. Superior Court of Sonoma County
1. Factual and ProceduralBackground

Attorney Donald Hinkle structured a transaction for William Daniel, in which Daniel received a two-thirds interest in
a steel business.3 7 On June 20, 1989, during Daniel's marital
dissolution proceeding, a trial court judge entered an interlocutory order to the effect that Daniel's wife had a community
interest in the business. 38 Daniel believed this outcome was
a result of Hinkle's faulty lawyering, and he telephoned attorney Gail Flatt a month after the filing of the order to discuss
his grievance with her.3 9
On July 27, 1989, Daniel and Flatt had an hour-long
meeting, during which Daniel disclosed confidential information to Flatt regarding the structuring of the 1980 transac40
tion, and turned over several documents to her. According
to Daniel, Flatt told him during the meeting that he "defi4
nitely" had a claim for legal malpractice against Hinkle. In
a August 3, 1989 letter, however, Flatt informed Daniel that
she could not represent him in his dispute with Hinkle because her firm had a conflict-it represented Hinkle in an unput off his search for another lawyer
related matter.4 2 Daniel
43
for a year and a half.
On June 3, 1991, nearly two years after the meeting with
Flatt, Daniel filed suit against Flatt and the other partners in
36.
37.
38.
39.

885 P.2d 950 (Cal. 1994).
Id. at 952.
Id.
Id.

40. Id.

41. Flatt v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 885 P.2d 950, 952 (Cal.
1994).
42. Id.
43. Id.
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her firm.44 Daniel alleged that Flatt had breached a duty to
Daniel in failing to advise him regarding the statute of limitations which governed his claims against Hinkle, and in failing to advise him to seek other counsel to avoid having the
claim time-barred. 45 Flatt moved for summary judgment on
the ground that she owed no duty to advise Daniel, because
such advice would have been contrary to the interests of her
client Hinkle.46
The trial court denied Flatt's motion for summary judgment, stating that there remained triable issues of fact on the
question of whether an attorney-client relationship ever existed between Daniel and Flatt. The Court of Appeal affirmed the ruling of the trial court 47, holding that an attorney-client relationship could have been formed under
Daniel's version of the July 27 meeting. 48 One justice dissented from the ruling, reasoning that the dispositive issue in
the case was really whether, even assuming Daniel had become a client of Flatt's, Flatt owed a duty to Daniel to inform
him of the statute of limitations. 49 The Supreme Court thereafter granted Daniel's petition for review.5 °
2. The Majority Opinion
The majority opinion assumed, for the purposes of its
analysis, that Daniel had in fact become a client of Flatt's
during their brief meeting together.51 Nevertheless, the
44. Id. Daniel also brought suit against the Hinkle firm for legal malpractice regarding matters arising out of the structuring of the 1980 transaction and
1987 interlocutory decree. Id.
45. Id. Daniel sought damages for legal malpractice against Flatt in the
event that it was determined that his claims against Hinkle were barred by the
statute of limitations. Id.
46. Flatt v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 885 P.2d 950, 952 (Cal.
1994).
47. Id. The Court of Appeal initially refused to intervene in response to a
writ of mandate brought by Daniel. Id. The Supreme Court, however, granted
Daniel's petition for review and transferred the cause back to the Court of Appeal for issuance of an alternative writ. Id.
48. Id. In concluding that an attorney-client could have been formed, the
Court of Appeal relied upon Daniel's assertion that Flatt had given him "a little
bit of an opinion" regarding whether he had a valid claim. Id. This assertion
was in contradiction of Daniel's prior deposition testimony. Id.
49. Id. at 953. The Supreme Court opinion does not reveal the manner by
which the dissenting justice resolved this question.
50. Id. at 951.
51. Flatt v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 885 P.2d 950, 951 (Cal.
1994). The majority did not feel the need to resolve the question of whether an

1388

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

Court examined conflict of interest principles to determine
whether Flatt had an obligation to give advice to the newer
client Daniel upon the severance of representation.52
The Court begins its analysis by stating that "[n]either
the parties' research nor our own has unearthed case authority squarely in point."5 3 The Court cites, however, to California Rule of Professional Conduct 3-310" for the proposition
that an attorney is prohibited from accepting or continuing
representation of more than one client in a matter if the interests of the clients conflict. 55

The Court then makes a sharp distinction between "successive representation" conflicts, where a conflict arises between a former client and a present client, and "simultaneous
representation" conflicts, where a conflict arises between two
present clients. 56 In the former type of conflicts, a "substantial relationship" test is utilized to determine whether or not
7
an attorney must be disqualified from representation. If a
substantial relationship can be shown between "the subjects
of the antecedent and current representations", disqualification of the attorney and the attorney's firm is mandatory because it is presumed that the attorney is in possession of confidential information obtained during the first
representation."

Where the representations are simultaneous or concurrent, however, the Court emphasizes that the important
attorney-client relationship between Daniel and Flatt was formed because, as
will be seen, it felt that no duty was owed in any event. Id. Therefore, the
question of Daniel's "client status" was not "itself material to the dispositive
legal issue." Id.
The majority's reasoning in this regard may well be seriously questioned.
It is true that the client status of Daniel is irrelevant if no duty is owed him
regardless of whether or not he was a client. The converse, however, is also
true. The question of whether Flatt owed a duty to Daniel is only relevant if it
is first determined that, in fact, an attorney-client relationship had been
formed. Therefore, it appears that the Court might have been able to resolve
the case summarily if it felt that no attorney-client relationship had been
formed, without ever tackling the thornier issue of whether a duty existed given
such a relationship.
52. Id. at 953-60.
53. Id. at 953.
54. CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3-310 (1994).
55. Flatt, 885 P.2d at 954.
56. Flatt v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 885 P.2d 950, 954 (Cal.
1994).
57. Id.
58. Id.
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question is not whether the two representations have a substantial relationship, but whether the attorney's duty of loyalty is affected. 5 9 In most cases, the "rule of disqualification
in simultaneous representation cases is a per se or 'automatic' one" even if the representations have nothing in common.6 The reason for this automatic disqualification rule is
"evident"-a client cannot be expected to continue placing
trust and confidence in a attorney who is also representing an
adverse party.'
Thus, "it ought to follow that Flatt had no duty to give
Daniel advice that would, incrementally at least, have aided
in advancing his contemplated lawsuit against Hinkle, the
firm's existing client."62 The giving of any advice to Daniel in
order to advance his lawsuit would constitute an act that
6 3 The Court had
would harm Flatt's existing client Hinkle.
"no difficulty", therefore, in concluding that "any advice to
Daniel regarding the statute of limitations governing his
claim against Hinkle would have run counter to the interests
of an existing client of Flatt and her firm and of their obliga64
tion of undivided loyalty to him." 65Consequently, Flatt had
advice.
no duty to give Daniel such
The Court also points out that, not only would the imposition of a duty to give Daniel advice run contrary to Flatt's
duty of loyalty to Hinkle, but it would have practically operated to place the relationship between Hinkle and Flatt in an
59. Id. at 955.
60. Id.
61. Flatt v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 885 P.2d 950, 955 (Cal.
1994). The Court notes that exceptions to this automatic disqualification rule
do exist. Id. at 956 n.4. In particular, most courts permit an attorney to continue simultaneous representation of clients "provided full disclosure is made
and both clients agree in writing to waive the conflict." Id. at 956 n.4. However, the Court points out that these type of cases are rare, since "overcoming
the presumption of'prima facie impropriety' is not easily accomplished." Id. at
956 n.4. The Court states that this exception is not relevant to the instant case
in any event, because Flatt understandably decided not to represent Daniel. Id.
at 956 n.4.
62. Id. at 958.
63. Id. at 958-59.
64. Id. at 959.
65. Id. at 959. The Court did indicate that its approach might change if
different factual circumstances exist-most particularly, if there is a "lapse of
considerable time and the expenditure of substantial resources" on the client's
case "before discovery of the conflicting dual representation." Id. at 959 n.6.
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"insupportably awkward position." 66 Any client in Hinkle's
position "would be entitled to wonder whether the law's sense
of casuistry had gone seriously wrong" once the client found
out that advice had been given to a "would-be adversary."67
In addition, Flatt had no duty to advise Daniel to
promptly seek other counsel, for Daniel "obviously knew" that
he had to keep looking for an attorney if he wished to bring
his claim.68 Though it is ordinarily "prudent" for an attorney
to provide such withdrawal advice, the ethical dilemma
which would be raised by imposing upon Flatt the duty to
provide advice which was against the interests of her existing
client Hinkle mandates that no such duty be imposed under
69
the circumstances.
3.

The Dissenting Opinion

Justice Kennard's dissenting opinion disagreed with the
majority's reasoning because she believed the majority had
misstated the issue. 70 The real issue was whether Flatt satisfied her "duty to use the skill, prudence, and diligence commonly possessed by other attorneys."7 1 Since presumably
Daniel had become a client of Flatt's, Flatt assumed a duty of
care towards him.7 2 Flatt owed, in fact, the same duty of care
towards Daniel as she owed towards "Hinkle and every other
client."73 The majority, however, solely focused on the duty of
loyalty owed Hinkle, without seriously considering the duty
of care owed to Daniel.7 4
The dissent argued that because a duty of care is owed
Daniel, the relevant question is how broad the scope of this
duty is. 7 5 Thus, the pertinent inquiry is whether, under the
66. Flatt v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 885 P.2d 950, 959 (Cal.
1994).
67. Id.
68. Id. In fact, the Court pointed out that Daniel "admitted as much at his
deposition." Id.
69. Id. at 959-60.
70. Id. at 961.
71. Flatt v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 885 P.2d 950, 961 (Cal.
1994).
72. Id. at 961-62. Though Justice Kennard assumes, as does the majority,
that Daniel was Flatt's client, she does point out that it is "unclear" whether
Hinkle was in fact a client of Flatt's firm when the representation of Daniel
began. Id. at 960 n.2.
73. Id. at 962.
74. Id. at 964.
75. Id. at 962.
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facts of the case, Flatt was "obligated to advise Daniel of the
statute of limitations, or of the need to promptly retain new
counsel."76 This is a question of fact, which could only be resolved on a motion for summary judgment if Flatt established, through uncontroverted expert evidence, that an "reasonably prudent lawyer" would not have advised Daniel of
the statute of limitations or of the need to obtain other
counsel.77
Since no evidence was presented to demonstrate what
the proper standard of care required, Flatt was not entitled to
summary judgment. 78 Flatt only sought summary judgment
and that she
on the ground that Daniel was never her client,
79
did not therefore owe him any duty of advice. Neither party
submitted any evidence at all regarding the action a reasonably prudent lawyer would have taken in Flatt's situation,
assuming that an attorney-client relationship did exist.,,
that
Therefore, Flatt failed to establish, as a matter of law,
81
her actions satisfied the duty of care owed to Daniel.

,III. ANALYSIS
A. The Flaws in the Majority Approach
The majority approach has the advantage of simplicitythe attorney, as a result of the duty of loyalty to the pre-existing client, simply does not have a duty to give withdrawal
advice to the newer client. As will be shown below, however,
this approach is not adequately supported by California ethical rules or case law, will result in extreme and undue harm
to clients in Daniel's position, and will provide a disincentive
for firms to maintain more efficient conflict-checking
mechanisms.
76. Flatt v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 885 P.2d 950, 962 (Cal.
1994).
77. Id. at 963-64.
78. Id. at 964.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Flatt v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 885 P.2d 950, 964 (Cal.
1994). The dissenting opinion notes that a denial of Flatt's summary judgment
motion would not inevitably lead to Daniel prevailing in his malpractice action.
Id. Daniel would still have to show that an attorney-client relationship arose
between him and Flatt, that the standard of care applicable to Flatt required
her to give Daniel advice, and that Flatt's failure to give advice caused Daniel to
lose his action against Hinkle. Id. at 964-65.
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Majority Fails to Expressly Recognize the Existence
of a Duty to Avoid ForeseeablePrejudice Upon
Withdrawal

Instead of frankly grappling with the conflict between
the duty to avoid foreseeable prejudice upon withdrawal and
the duty of loyalty, the majority opinion solely focuses on the
latter, and never expressly recognizes that Flatt had a ethical
duty to withdraw in such a manner as to avoid foreseeable
prejudice to Daniel. The majority does not even acknowledge,
much less grapple with, California case law which indicates
that the duty to avoid foreseeable prejudice upon withdrawal
may, in appropriate instances, include the duty to give withdrawal advice to a client. 8 2 Indeed, since the majority assumes that Daniel had already become a client of Flatt's,8 3
California Rule of Professional Conduct 3-700 indicates that
Flatt had a duty to give withdrawal advice so long as the failure to do would cause foreseeable prejudice." 4 Yet, the majority does not even mention Rule 3-700, explain why the duty
imposed under this rule should be subordinated to the attorney's duty of loyalty, or explain why the rule should be rendered a nullity where there is a withdrawal from a concurrent representation. 8 5
2.

Lack of Support for Majority Approach in
CaliforniaRules of ProfessionalConduct

There is no language anywhere in the California Code of
Professional Responsibility which would indicate that the
duty to avoid foreseeable prejudice upon withdrawal is in any
way subordinate to the attorney's duty to avoid concurrent
representations or its concomitant duty of loyalty. Indeed,
Rule 3-700 itself is phrased in mandatory terms: "A member
shall not withdraw from employment until the member has
taken reasonable steps to avoid reasonably foreseeable prejudice to the rights of the client" (emphasis added).8 6 No ex82. See supra notes 19-33 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text
84. CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3-700(A)(1994).
85. The dissent, indeed, points out that the majority omitted any discussion
of Rule 3-700. Flatt, 885 P.2d at 963. Justice Kennard recognizes that Flatt's
conduct during withdrawal of representation was governed by Rule 3-700, but
states that "[o]ddly, the majority does not discuss this rule." Id.
86. CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3-700(A)(1994).
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press or implied exception to this requirement can be located
Conduct.8 7
anywhere in the California Rules of Professional
In addition, there is no indication in the California Rules
that Rule 3-310,88 which prohibits concurrent representations absent consent, is of any greater importance than any
other of the ethical rules. There is, in particular, no indication that Rule 3-3 10 "trumps" the withdrawal duties imposed
by Rule 3-700. Consequently, nothing in the California Rules
lends credence to the idea that the withdrawal duties imposed by Rule 3-700 should, at least as an ethical matter, be
subordinated to the duty imposed by Rule 3-310 to avoid conflicting interests.
Lack of Support for Majority Approach in
California Case Law
It is acknowledged by the majority that no judicial precedent exists which squarely addresses the ethical dilemma
presented in Flatt.8 9 The only cases cited by the majority
the
deal solely with the duty of loyalty, and never mention
9° The
withdrawal.
upon
duty to avoid foreseeable prejudice
fact, however, that the duty of loyalty has been recognized by
courts as important is no support for the conclusion that the
duty is relatively more important than a duty which conflicts
with it. The majority cites no precedent for the proposition
that there exists a hierarchy of ethical duties in which a
"higher" duty (the duty of loyalty) can automatically supersede a "lower" one (the duty to avoid foreseeable prejudice
upon withdrawal), at least without detailed analysis of the
client interests involved.
Though recognizing the lack of authority on the precise
issue before it, the majority nevertheless decides to stake its
analysis on the "principle of loyalty" as enunciated in prior
3.

87. The California Rules of Professional Responsibility do, however, indicate that the duty to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the client upon withdrawal
will "vary according to the circumstances". Id., Discussion, Rule 3-700(D). The
duty of loyalty owed to a remaining client upon withdrawal could be considered
a "circumstance" such that Rule 3-700 need not be complied with fully. However, this language is more plausibly interpreted to mean that the duty should
vary according to the amount of prejudice which would be foreseeably suffered-not that the "circumstance" of a conflicting ethical duty could "vary" the
duty out of existence.
88. CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3-310(1994).
89. Flatt v. Superior Ct. of Sonoma Cty., 885 P.2d 950, 953 (Cal. 1994).
90. Id. at 953-58.
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case law. 9 1 Despite the majority's assertions to the contrary,
however, this principle simply does not provide an adequate
foundation for the majority's holding. There are simply no
cases which utilize the duty of loyalty to regulate attorney
conduct after a concurrent representation has already developed. Rather, all the seminal cases explicating the attorney's
duty of loyalty involved its application to determine whether
the concurrent representation itself is improper and therefore
mandates disqualification.9 2
More importantly, however, the majority overlooks cases
dealing with a closely analagous situation to the one considered in Flatt. Where an attorney has been disqualified, and
therefore forced to withdraw from a concurrent representation, trial courts have issued orders which force attorneys to
protect the interests of the former client. In McCourt Co. v.
FPC Properties, Inc.,9 for example, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts approved of a trial court order disqualifying a law firm because of a concurrent representation.94 The court approved of the portion of the trial court
order which mandated the law firm's "cooperation over a limited transitional period with successor counsel" for the former
client. 9 5 The court stated that the disengagement of the law
firm from the case "should be carried out with fair considera9 6 The
tion of the interests" of both of the clients involved.
court approved, therefore, of a situation in which a law firm
was ordered to aid its former client's substitute counsel in
taking over the case, even though such aid would undoubtedly run contrary to the interests of its remaining client.
Likewise, in Kabi Pharmacia AB v. Alcon Surgical,
,'97
Inc. the District Court disqualified a law firm due to a concurrent conflict. In response to the argument that the disqualification of the firm would severely impair the client's
"ability to defend itself", the court noted that the disqualifica91. Id. at 958.
92. See, e.g., Anderson v. Eaton, 293 P. 788 (Ca. 1930) (involving an evaluation of a concurrent representation in worker's compensation proceedings ; Jeffry v. Pounds, 136 Cal.Rptr. 373 (Cal. 1977)(suit for attorney fees hinging on
whether a concurrent representation was proper).
93. 434 N.E.2d 1234 (Mass. 1982).
94. Id. at 1238.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 803 F. Supp. 957 (D. Del. 1992).

FLATT V. SUPERIOR COURT

1995]

1395

tion order could be fashioned to permit the firm "to assist in

98 Even though,
bringing replacement counsel up to speed."
therefore, the firm was representing the remaining client in
unrelated matters, it still could be ordered to assist the former client's successor counsel.
These cases suggest that an attorney should, while in the
process of disentangling him or herself from a concurrent representation, act in a manner which is fair to both clients involved, even though only one of them technically remains a
present client. The majority, therefore, could have focused on
such cases to hold that Flatt had a duty, even though she still
represented Hinkle after her withdrawal from Daniel, to
carry out the withdrawal with fair consideration of the interests of both Hinkle and Daniel.
Not only, therefore, does there not exist any case law
which supports the majority's utilization of the duty of loyalty
to a withdrawal from a concurrent representation, but case
law does exist which demonstrate that such withdrawals
should be handled with the former client's interests in mind.
If there is any conclusion possible from existing case law,
therefore, it is that a withdrawal from a concurrent representation should be performed in a manner which considers the
interests of both the remaining client and the former client.

4.

The Majority Approach Will Result in Extreme
Harm to Clients in Daniel's Position

Because the case law does not support the majority's utilization of the duty of loyalty, and because both of the conflicting ethical duties at issue in Flatt exist for the benefit of the
client, the resolution of the ethical dilemma should turn on a
more practical evaluation of the potential harm to clients. It
is important, therefore, to evaluate the majority approach
and determine whether it properly balances the interests of
both of the clients involved.
There can be little doubt, first of all, that the majority
approach might cause extreme harm to a client who unwittingly hires an attorney representing the client's potential
adversary. This is because the majority's myopic focus on the
interests of the pre-existing client would seem to foreclose
98. Id.
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any inquiry into the harm suffered by the newer client upon
withdrawal, no matter how significant the harm may be.
Take, for example, a situation in which a client has
placed substantial reliance upon the attorney, and in which
significant amounts of time and money have been expended
during the representation. The attorney could withdraw
from representation of such a client immediately upon the development of a simultaneous conflict, and would not have to
give the client needed information even though the client had
placed trust and confidence in the attorney.
Consider, in addition, the situation in which the limitations period on a client's claim would expire within an extremely short amount of time. If a concurrent representation
develops or is discovered at such a moment, the attorney
could withdraw from representation without informing the
client of the impending deadline, thereby ensuring as a practical matter that the client will not hire successor counsel until it is too late to bring the claim.
In both of the above scenarios, the client would suffer extreme harm as a result of the withdrawal. Yet, since any
withdrawal advice would, according to the majority, "run
counter to the interests" of the pre-existing client, the attor99
ney would be under no obligation to give the advice. Subordinating the duty to avoid foreseeable prejudice upon withdrawal, therefore, would enable an attorney to withdraw in
such a manner as to completely destroy any chance a client
may have to bring a claim, even if the client has not acted
wrongfully.
It is true that the majority indicates in a footnote that its
approach could change if different factual circumstances exist. In certain factual circumstances where there would be
"substantial prejudice" to a client's interests, the Court indicates that "an attorney's mere withdrawal from the second
representation may not be sufficient in itself to resolve all
ethical responsibilities." 10 0 By requiring, however, a consideration of the "prejudice" suffered by a client as a result of a
withdrawal, the exception completely undercuts the entire
rationale of the majority's holding. After all, regardless of the
amount of "prejudice" which would be suffered by the former
client, withdrawal advice would still "run counter to the in99. Flatt v. Superior Ct. of Sonoma Cty., 885 P.2d 950, 959 (Cal. 1994).
100. Id. at 959 n.6.
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terests" of the pre-existing client. Surely Hinkle would not, if
Daniel had suffered a greater amount of prejudice, be any
less "entitled to wonder whether the law's sense of casuistry
had gone seriously wrong." 10 1 In fact, the more prejudice suffered by Daniel as a result of the withdrawal, the more satisfied Hinkle would have been.
The majority opinion, therefore, is internally inconsistent. If the duty of loyalty is as absolute as the opinion represents, the attorney should not be under a duty to give withdrawal advice no matter how much prejudice the newer client
would suffer without the advice. If the duty of loyalty is not
so absolute, however, as to foreclose an inquiry into the
amount of such prejudice, then no reason appears why the
Court did not allow such an factual inquiry in Flatt.
5.

Majority Approach Places Undue Burden on the
Newer Client

Not only does the majority approach impose extreme
harm to clients in Daniel's position, but it also legitimizes attorney action which places the entire burden for the development of a conflict of interest on an innocent client. Daniel, for
example, did not act in any manner negligently or wrongfully
in hiring Flatt, but merely attempted in good faith to hire a
legal representative in order to bring his lawsuit against Hinkle. Yet, Daniel suffered all the negative consequences once
it was determined that his choice of attorneys inadvertently
created a conflict of interest.
Placing this burden on the innocent client makes even
less sense once it is recognized that there is practically nothing a potential client can do to prevent such a situation from
arising. Daniel was obviously not in a realistic position to
know whether Flatt's firm already represented Hinkle. The
only way Daniel could have prevented the conflict from arising was to refuse to hire Flatt until her firm represented to
him that it did not already represent Hinkle. It is both unfair
to place this burden on the potential client, and unrealistic to
expect that potential clients would ever require such
assurances.

101. Id. at 959.
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Majority Approach Places Inordinate Weight on the
Interests of the Pre-existing Client

In addition to the fact that the majority approach will
inevitably result in severe consequences for clients in
Daniel's position, the approach cannot be justified by the benefits it provides to the pre-existing client.
It must be remembered that withdrawal advice to the
newer client would not put the pre-existing client's case in a
worse position than it would have been in had the conflict
never arisen. If Daniel had originally hired any attorney
other than Flatt to represent him, this other attorney would
presumably have filed Daniel's lawsuit before the expiration
of the limitations period. Consequently, informing Daniel of
the limitations period upon withdrawal would merely give
Daniel a chance to hire successor counsel, and therefore give
him an opportunity to place himself in the same position he
would have been in had he hired another attorney in the first
place.
In other words, withdrawal advice to the newer client
would not operate to advance such a client's case beyond the
point where the case should have been absent the conflict.
The advice would only serve to prevent the withdrawal from
permanently damaging the newer client's lawsuit. The preexisting client is simply prevented from reaping the benefits
of a conflict which was innocently and inadvertently created.
Put simply, Hinkle had roughly the same chances of succeeding in the lawsuit if withdrawal advice had been given to
Daniel as would have existed if the conflict had never been
created.
The Majority Approach Provides A Disincentive for
Firms to Develop More Efficient ConflictChecking Mechanisms
The majority approach, by absolving the attorney from
any liability for failing to give withdrawal advice, actually
provides a disincentive for firms to develop more efficient
methods of checking for conflicts of interest. Because all of
the negative consequences which would flow from the development of a concurrent conflict fall on the shoulders of the
innocent, newer client, a firm has no economic motivation to
ensure that such a situation does not occur. An attorney can
simply hire clients without worrying about possible conflicts,
7.

1995]

FLATT V. SUPERIOR COURT

1399

knowing that if a conflict develops the newer client can simply be "dumped" without any liability flowing from the
withdrawal.
B.

The Flaws in the Dissent's Approach

The dissenting opinion, unlike the majority, does expressly recognize that a duty may exist to avoid foreseeable
10 2
The
prejudice to a client by giving withdrawal advice.
opinion concludes, however, that it is for the trier of fact to
determine, under the facts of each individual case, whether
the attorney has acted correctly. 10 3 Despite the appearance
of added flexibility which this approach provides, the dissent's resolution of the matter is nearly as unsatisfactory as
the majority's approach.
1.

The Dissent's Approach Fails to Provide Adequate
Guidance to the Jury

The dissent's approach would allow the jury to find liability in the conventional manner, i.e. where the attorney has
not acted with the "skill, prudence, and diligence commonly
possessed by other attorneys."104 The problem with this approach is that the jury would be placed in the unenviable position of having to find that a "reasonably prudent" attorney
would have knowingly violated an ethical rule. For instance,
in order to find Flatt liable, the jury would have had to find
that a "reasonably prudent" attorney would, in her situation,
have purposely violated the duty of loyalty to Hinkle. Conversely, to absolve Flatt of liability, the jury would have had
to find that a "reasonably prudent" attorney would have purposely violated any withdrawal duties owed to Daniel. The
jury would be, consequently, placed in the position of an legal
ethics committee by being forced to make judgments on which
ethical duty should be subordinated to the other.
2.

The Dissent's Approach Fails to Provide Adequate
Guidance for Attorneys

More importantly, the dissent's approach would make it
practically impossible for an attorney caught in Flatt's situa102. Id. at 963.
103. Id. at 963-65.

104. Flatt v. Superior Ct. of Sonoma Cty., 885 P.2d 950, 961 (Cal. 1994).
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tion to know what action should be taken to avoid being subject to malpractice liability or disciplinary sanctions.
Suppose, for example, an attorney in Flatt's situation refuses to give withdrawal advice. Under the dissent's approach, a jury would be entitled to find that a reasonably prudent attorney would have given such advice. 10 5 Such an
attorney, therefore, would risk being subject to malpractice
liability. In addition, it is always possible that the attorney
would be disciplined for violating Rule 3-700, because no
steps were taken upon withdrawal to avoid foreseeable preju10 6
dice to the client.

On the other hand, suppose that an attorney in Flatt's
situation chooses to give the withdrawal advice. The dissent's approach would also allow the jury to find that the giving of the advice constituted a breach of the attorney's duty of
loyalty. Consequently, the attorney would risk being subject
to malpractice liability as a result of such a jury finding. In
addition, because the duty of loyalty was found to10 be
7
breached, the attorney may also be subject to discipline.
It is clear, therefore, that an attorney caught in Flatt's
situation could not feel secure in either available option. Potential malpractice liability would exist for the attorney regardless of whether the withdrawal advice is given or not, because a jury would be entitled to find that either choice was
unreasonable.
IV.

PROPOSAL

It is clear that neither the approach offered by the majority nor the approach offered by the dissent represents a satisfactory resolution to the ethical dilemma presented in Flatt.
The majority approach involves an overly confining view of
the duty of loyalty and fails to even take into account the interests of the newer client. 10 8 The dissent's approach injects
too much flexibility into the analysis to provide appropriate
guidance for attorneys. 10 9 What is needed is a rule which
minimizes the harm to the newer client, takes into account
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
See
See
See
See

supra notes 9-32 and accompanying text.
supra notes 2-19 and accompanying text.
supra pt. III.A.
supra pt. III.B.
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both ethical duties involved, and provides adequate guidance
for attorney conduct.
This paper, therefore, proposes that an attorney should
be under a duty to give withdrawal advice when withdrawing
from a concurrent representation, if the failure to give such
advice would cause reasonably foreseeable prejudice because
it could not be effectively provided by successor counsel. The
duty to avoid foreseeable prejudice upon withdrawal under
Rule 3-700 should not, in other words, be subordinated to the
duty of loyalty. However, the withdrawal advice which must
be given would only be such as would give the client a reasonable opportunity to effectively retain another attorney.
The advantages of imposing such a duty upon the attorney in Flatt's situation are many. First of all, providing the
newer client with withdrawal advice would minimize the
harm to such a client caused by the withdrawal. The newer
client would at least receive the information needed to hire
successor counsel before the expiration of the limitations period. Secondly, providing such advice would not allow the attorney to unduly harm the client simply because the latter
made an unfortunate choice of attorneys. Third, forcing the
attorney to give the client information regarding the limitations period would prevent Rule 3-700 from becoming a nullity when concurrent representation situations arise. Fourth,
the fear of malpractice liability would provide motivation for
firms to develop more efficient conflict-checking mechanisms.
In addition, holding that a duty to provide advice exists
would be far preferable to the uncertainties inherent in the
dissent's approach. An attorney would not be forced to guess
as to the proper course of action when withdrawing from a
concurrent representation. The rule would be simple-if the
failure to provide withdrawal advice would cause foreseeable
prejudice to the client because the client would not have an
effective opportunity to receive the advice from successor
counsel, then the information must be given upon
withdrawal.
There should, however, be a few caveats to this general
rule. First, giving the client information regarding the statute of limitations must be treated separately from other sorts
of withdrawal advice, such as litigation strategy. The former
is information which the client needs to know in order to obtain substitute counsel in the required time. The latter, how-
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ever, is not information needed to "avoid foreseeable prejudice" to the client, because presumably successor counsel will
be able to provide the client such advice.
Secondly, the duty to give information upon withdrawal
must only encompass that information which is necessary in
order for the client to effectively obtain successor counsel
before the running of the limitations period. The attorney
must consider the exigency of the client's situation, and give
only that information which is narrowly tailored to fit the exigent circumstances. Once the attorney gives information
which the client does not need in order to avoid foreseeable
prejudice, the protection of Rule 3-700 does not apply and the
attorney has violated the duty of loyalty.
Lastly, the duty to give withdrawal advice should not be
considered to arise at all except in the proper factual context.
Such a duty should, according to the dictates of Rule 3-700,
only arise when a failure to give such advice would
foreseeably cause prejudice to the client's case.11° If the statute of limitations still has many more months to run, the attorney might not be obligated to inform the client of the limitations period in any event.11
V.

CONCLUSION

Both the majority and the dissent in the Flatt case
thoughtfully examine the conflict between the duty of loyalty
and the duty to give withdrawal advice. Neither analysis,
however, is ultimately persuasive. The majority's approach
would unduly penalize a client who inadvertently selects for
representation the attorney who already represents an adverse party. The dissent's approach would not provide any
guidance to attorneys should future conflicts arise. Only by
enforcing the attorney's duty to provide withdrawal advice to
the newer client can the interests of the pre-existing client,
the newer client, the attorney, and the legal profession in
general be adequately reconciled.

110. See supra pt. II.B.
111. The Flatt court did not specify how soon the limitations period on
Daniel's malpractice claim expired after the withdrawal. If it did not expire
until many months after the withdrawal, it might be argued that Flatt should
have succeeded in her summary judgment motion solely because of this fact.

